Certainty of meeting fertility intentions declines in Europe during the 'Great Recession' by Testa, Maria Rita & Basten, Stuart
www.ssoar.info
Certainty of meeting fertility intentions declines in
Europe during the 'Great Recession'
Testa, Maria Rita; Basten, Stuart
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Testa, M. R., & Basten, S. (2014). Certainty of meeting fertility intentions declines in Europe during the 'Great
Recession'. Demographic Research, 31, 687-734. https://doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2014.31.23
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC Lizenz (Namensnennung-
Nicht-kommerziell) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu
den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC Licence
(Attribution-NonCommercial). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0
  
 
DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH 
 
VOLUME 31, ARTICLE 23, PAGES 687734 
PUBLISHED 18 SEPTEMBER 2014 
http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol31/23/ 
DOI: 10.4054/DemRes.2014.31.23 
 
Research Article 
 
Certainty of meeting fertility intentions declines in 
Europe during the ‘Great Recession’ 
 
 
Maria Rita Testa  
Stuart Basten 
 
 
 
© 2014 Maria Rita Testa & Stuart Basten. 
 
This open-access work is published under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution NonCommercial License 2.0 Germany, which permits use, 
reproduction & distribution in  any medium for non-commercial purposes,  
provided the original author(s) and source are given credit.  
See http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/ 
Table of Contents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 688 
   
2 Background 689 
2.1 Period fertility rates and the ‘Great Recession’ 689 
2.2 Relationship between fertility and economic shocks 690 
2.3 Beyond a relationship between fertility, GDP and individual 
unemployment? 
691 
2.4 The ‘Great Recession’, fertility, and perceptions of uncertainty 695 
   
3 Research hypotheses 696 
   
4 Data and methods 697 
4.1 Selected sample 697 
4.2 Response variables 698 
4.3 Explanatory variables 700 
4.4 The models 701 
   
5 Results 703 
5.1 Descriptive findings: fertility intentions and reproductive 
uncertainty in 2006–2011 
703 
5.2 Individual’s, household’s, and country’s economic situation in 
2006–2011 
706 
5.3 Multilevel analysis of fertility intentions 709 
5.4 Multilevel analysis of reproductive uncertainty 712 
   
6 Discussion 715 
   
7 Acknowledgments 718 
   
 References 719 
   
 Appendix 726 
   
Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 23 
Research Article 
http://www.demographic-research.org 687 
Certainty of meeting fertility intentions declines in Europe during 
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Stuart Basten
2
 
Abstract 
BACKGROUND 
Relatively little research has been conducted on how economic recessions impact 
fertility intentions. In particular, uncertainty in reproductive intentions has not been 
examined in relation to economic shocks. 
 
OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the impact of individuals‟ perception of 
negative changes in both their own and their country‟s economic performance on 
reproductive intentions in Europe during the time of the “Great Recession” (2006-
2011). Crucially, we examine both intentions and stated certainty of meeting these 
intentions. 
 
METHODS 
Using the 2011 Eurobarometer survey for 27 European countries, fertility intentions 
and reproductive uncertainty are regressed on individuals‟ perceptions of past trends 
in country‟s economic situation, household‟s financial situation, and personal job 
situation. Multilevel ordinal regressions models are run separately for people at 
parities zero and one as well as controlling for a set of socio-demographic variables.  
 
RESULTS 
A worsening in the households‟ financial situation, as perceived in the years of the 
economic crisis, does not affect people‟s fertility intentions but rather the certainty 
of meeting these intentions. This relationship holds true at the individual-level for 
childless people. The more negative the individual‟s assessment of the household‟s 
financial situation, the higher the reproductive uncertainty. While this works 
exclusively at the country-level for people at parity one, the higher the share of 
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people‟s pessimism on households‟ financial situation in the country the more 
insecure individuals of such a country are about having additional children.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical evidence suggests that individuals‟ uncertainty about realising their 
fertility intentions has risen in Europe and is positively linked to people‟s perceived 
household financial difficulties. If European economies continue to fare poorly, 
fertility intentions could eventually start to decline in response to such difficulties.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
When asked to estimate their future complete family size, individuals tend to over-
estimate the number of children they will have in their whole reproductive career; 
nevertheless, their lifetime fertility intentions are a strong predictor of their actual 
fertility (Bongaarts 2001; Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan 2003; Schoen et al. 1999). 
One of the most important values of reproductive intentions lies in the fact that they 
are informative about directional trends: actual and intended fertility show similar 
trends despite the fact that they are at different levels (Goldstein, Lutz, and Testa 
2003; Hin et al. 2011).  
In this context,  it is surprising that while the recent economic crisis in Europe – 
coined the „Great Recession‟ – has been studied in relation to actual fertility (see, 
among others, Sobotka, Skirbekk, and Philipov 2011), no analysis of the relationship 
between the crisis and fertility intentions has yet been carried out. If the recent 
economic crisis has played a role in re-shaping attitudes towards childbearing, either 
through views of individual life courses to come or through a general attitudinal shift 
in the place of family within society, this could affect the anticipated recovery in the 
period Total Fertility Rate [pTFR] after the end of the recession in some countries. 
This could suggest the possibility of an impact upon cohort/quantum fertility.  
Using multilevel models on data from the 2011 Eurobarometer [EB] survey, we 
examine the relationship between lifetime fertility intentions and the  
“Great Recession” in 27 EU countries.3 Individuals‟ subjective evaluations of their 
country‟s economic situation, their household‟s financial situation, and their 
personal job situation over the past five years, i.e., 2006‒2011, are used to measure 
people‟s perceptions of their own changes and their country‟s economic 
performance during the time of the “Great Recession” and the impact these have on 
                                                          
3 Croatia, not being a member of EU in 2011, is excluded from the analysis. The analysis of Germany is 
divided into „East‟ and „West‟ conforming to the former boundaries of the German Democratic Republic 
and the Federal Republic of Germany. As such, the analysis is based upon 28 territorial units in 27 
countries. 
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reproductive intentions. Crucially, we examine both intentions and stated certainty 
of meeting these intentions. 
 
 
2. Background 
2.1 Period fertility rates and the ‘Great Recession’ 
During the 1990s, pTFRs across much of Europe fell to very low levels (Kohler, 
Billari, and Ortega 2002). As Figure 1 demonstrates, most countries generally saw 
an upturn in pTFR in the 2000s, largely as a result of the tempo effect of 
postponement of births to later ages (Sobotka 2004). In 2008, for example, pTFR 
was rising in every country in Europe, apart from a marginal decline in Luxembourg 
(Eurostat 2013). However, in all but six EU countries, pTFR either declined in 2010 
or stagnated. Latvia saw the most pronounced decline as the country grappled with 
extremely high unemployment and a massive contraction of the economy. In 
Hungary, Malta, and Romania a transition from stagnation to decline occurred, 
while in Bulgaria, Cyprus and, to an extent, Slovakia recent increases sharply turned 
to declines. For most countries, meanwhile, recent increases in fertility turned to 
stagnation in 2010 (with the exceptions of Denmark and Spain). Luxembourg, 
Sweden, Germany, Slovenia, Portugal, and Austria each saw modest increases in 
fertility during 2010. Clearly, the relationship between the „Great Recession‟ and 
pTFR in Europe is neither straightforward nor unidirectional.  
 
Figure 1:  Recent trends in pTFR in the EU27 
(a) Eastern Europe   (b) Southern Europe 
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Figure 1: (Continued) 
(c) Northern Europe   (d) Continental Western Europe 
 
 
Source: (Eurostat 2013) 
 
 
2.2 Relationship between fertility and economic shocks 
The economic argument concerning fertility and recession is, fundamentally, 
whether or not the relationship is pro- or counter-cyclical. The argument for a 
counter-cyclical relationship is based upon the assumption that temporary periods of 
unemployment constitute a good time for childbearing as the opportunity costs are 
lower. This, in turn, stems from Becker‟s microeconomic model of fertility (Becker, 
1960; Becker, 1991). Here, childbearing is recognised as profoundly time 
consuming, and the associated opportunity costs are closely linked to the potential 
wages of the parents. Rising male wages produce an income effect that raises 
demand for children. For women, rising female wages results in a combined income 
and substitution effect. The income effect raises the demand for children, while the 
substitution effect results in an increased cost of children relative to other goods. In 
this context, women (especially those with high potential wages) may restrict 
fertility and „trade-off‟ children for less time-demanding alternatives. On the other 
hand, when the substitution effect is diminished for women, perhaps through higher 
rates of unemployment, fertility should – theoretically – increase. 
The most widely quoted empirical evidence for a counter-cyclical relationship 
between fertility and recession concerns the increased birth rates of the United States 
in the 1960s and 1970s. Butz and Ward (1979a; 1979b), in particular, found 
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fertility in this period did, in fact, remain largely pro-cyclical (Macunovich 1995). 
Indeed, a pro-cyclical relationship between recession and fertility is one which 
appears to prevail in the literature. Empirically, this has been found to be the case in 
both long time series (Sobotka, Skirbekk, and Philipov 2011; Rindfuss, Morgan, and 
Swicegood 1988) and individual country data (e.g., Adsera 2011; Kravdal 2002; 
Macunovich 1996).  
 
 
2.3 Beyond a relationship between fertility, GDP and individual 
unemployment? 
While GDP growth is the measurement by which recession is technically defined, 
Sobotka, Skirbekk, and Philipov (2011) point out that in terms of household 
responses to economic conditions, such fluctuations in GDP are not necessarily the 
best variables to employ. Various studies for both the USA (Becker 1960) and the 
Netherlands (e.g., Fokkema et al. 2008) have examined the relationship between 
consumer confidence and fertility, with each broadly finding that declines in birth 
rates were positively associated with trends in both purchases and indices of 
consumer confidence (with appropriate lags).  
Unemployment is generally identified in the literature as a far more tangible 
measurement of the impact of recession upon men and women of reproductive age 
than, for example, GDP growth rates. The ongoing low fertility rates found in 
Southern Europe have been partly attributed to persistently high levels of 
unemployment and job instability (Adsera 2004; Adsera 2005a; Billari and Kohler 
2004). A negative relationship between unemployment and fertility has been found 
in a wide array of studies across Europe, North America, and East Asia (see 
Sobotka, Skirbekk, and Philipov 2011 for a complete review), with many of these 
studies disaggregating by gender effects (Örsal and Goldstein 2010) and by 
individual and aggregate unemployment (Kravdal 2002). Other studies have 
identified the importance of unemployment in determining timing of fertility – 
especially the transition to first birth (Meron and Widmer 2002). 
The association between unemployment and fertility is complex and 
heterogeneous across age, parity, institutional framework, and length of economic 
shock. In Finland, for example, the economic shock of the early 1990s was met with 
a continuing upward trend in births at parity two and above while first-order births 
were postponed (Vikat 2002; Vikat 2004) – a feature which suggests the possible 
role of strong welfare states in mitigating the impact of economic crisis upon 
fertility. A similar mixed relationship has recently been reported in Japan by 
Hashimoto and Kondo (2011) who found that in the period of recession, fertility 
among college-educated women who entered the labour market at the onset of 
recession rose, while fertility among secondary educated women and among women 
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who entered the labour market at the height of recession declined – or, likely, was 
postponed.  
Considering unemployment in the „Great Recession‟ in Europe we can see 
significant fluctuations across both time and space. Indeed, there is clear evidence of 
two distinct „peaks‟ of worsening unemployment in late 2008 and from mid-2011 
(Eurostat 2013). Unemployment has struck parts of Europe with different rates of 
intensity. Of the countries hit hardest by the sovereign debt crisis
4
 [hereafter „SDC 
countries‟], Greece, Spain, and Ireland have seen pronounced, constant increases in 
unemployment, with a sharp rise in Italy since 2011 (Eurostat 2013). The Baltic 
States (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) saw a sharp turnaround in 2008 as a result of 
a profound change in economic growth – but each of these appears to have brought 
unemployment back under control. Other new accession countries such as Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Cyprus and Slovenia have seen steady increases in unemployment up to 
around 10%, while the economic „miracles‟ in Poland and Slovakia have been 
halted. However, other large, Western and Northern economies have posted 
relatively modest increases in unemployment. Germany, indeed, returned a constant 
decline in unemployment over the period of the crisis. Turning to youth 
unemployment, the picture appears even starker. Among young people (aged below 
25) in 2011, unemployment rates in Greece and Spain hover around 45% with a 
further six countries – Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia – 
around 30% (Eurostat 2013). This, of course, is difficult to judge in relation to 
impacts on fertility. 
However, there is an argument to be made that the consideration of 
unemployment/employment as a binary variable in relation to childbearing choices 
and attitudes could be inadequate. As Emmenegger et al. (2012a) and others have 
observed, the changing nature of the European labour market over the past five 
decades has led to increased fragmentation and „dualisation‟ between „insiders‟ who 
are characterised by protected „jobs for life‟ and „outsiders‟ whose employment is 
precarious and vulnerable. This process has come about through the creeping 
deregularisation and liberalisation of employment contracts with a concomitant 
increase in „atypical employment contracts‟ such as fixed-term contracts and 
(sometimes involuntary) part-time employment. It is important to observe that 
women and young people are particularly affected by this transition towards „non-
standard‟ employment (Emmenegger et al. 2012a). In other words, the nature of 
„being employed‟ has changed dramatically over the past 40 years – and is an 
entirely different experience in different parts of Europe. As we suggest later, this 
means that the perception of national economic performance and the likely role of 
                                                          
4 These countries, namely Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, were arguably among those hardest 
hit by the Great Recession and saw a period characterized by collapse of financial institutions, high 
government debt, and rapidly rising bond yield spreads in government securities. 
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the individual‟s trajectory within that could be just as critical in shaping views 
regarding major life decisions as present individual employment status.  
Yet, this notion of the „dualisation‟ of the labour market is just one element of 
what Mills and Blossfeld (2005) observe to be the onset of increased uncertainty, 
especially for the young. For them, the process of globalisation has led to a 
heightened degree of uncertainty for those early in the life-course through the 
„endogenous intensification of innovation, increasing rate of economic and social 
change‟; acceleration of market transactions and the increasing volatility of the 
market. Before impacting micro-level „rational decision-making‟, however, they 
argue that this generalised uncertainty is „filtered‟ by institutions such as 
employment systems, education systems, welfare regimes, and family systems. With 
regard to employment and education, timing and ease of labour market entry, levels 
of unemployment and, crucially, stability and security of employment are defined by 
Mills and Blossfeld as key structural and institutional 'filters'. Meanwhile, the 
provision of „safety-net‟ welfare policies and/or active employment sustaining 
policies as well as contemporary attitudes towards the norms of family formation are 
also crucial. These, in turn, affect micro-level decisions regarding employment (type 
of job), partnerships (type and timing), and parenthood (timing). 
Strongly related to this is Giddens‟ sociological conception of „Risk‟ and Ulrich 
Beck‟s (1992) notion of the „Risk Society‟ – that „one of the major consequences of 
modernisation has been a tremendous intensification of real and perceived or 
socially mediated risk‟ (Hall 2002: 175). In other words, for Beck and Giddens, „risk 
has become strategic organizing principle guiding both individual and institutional 
thinking and action in contemporary society‟ (Hall 2002: 175). Over time, the 
modernisation of the family has assured that risk has been generally transferred to 
the individual, and given that the typical individual routinely encounters „a world of 
open social possibilities, ambiguity and contested risk knowledge‟ (Lupton 1999: 
65) the reflexive negotiation of this risk is a critical, ongoing activity of modern 
humans. Linking this back to demographic change, Hall (2002) hypothesises that 
any increases in (perceived) personal or societal „risk‟ will result in lowering fertility 
intentions, later entry into relationships and greater prevalence of co-habitation – 
each as a means of reducing (or postponing) assorted dimensions of interpersonal 
risk.  
Within this broad pattern of increasing uncertainty (or „risk‟), clearly eras of 
increased uncertainty will exist – such as in times of economic crisis. According to 
Breen (1997), this “temporal uncertainty” reduces attractiveness of long-term 
commitment and increases that of „contingent asymmetric commitment‟. In relation 
to employment, if such economic shocks exaggerate the economic uncertainty of 
already uncertain labour market positions this is likely to further inhibit the making 
of long-term commitments – such as parenthood – which require a secure economic 
basis. This is due to the fact that the necessary „minimum‟ level of economic 
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security – what Rindfuss and van den Heuvel (1990) call an „affordability clause‟ – 
is even less likely to be met in such straitened times. A development of this would 
be the „demand‟ theory of fertility which posits that childbearing, as a process of 
consumption of psychological, financial, and time resources which could be spent by 
parents elsewhere, can be foregone or delayed in straightened economic times 
(Brewster and Rindfuss 2000).  
Finally, in a Durkheimian (1893[2002]) sense, economic crisis and uncertainty 
can lead to anomie, or a breakdown in social norms. This can influence fertility 
outcomes through both micro- and macro-level mediators. Increased levels of stress 
and anxiety (Dooley, Fielding, and Levi 1996; Fenwick and Tausig 1994) associated 
with anomie can result in depression and poor health (Schneiderman, Ironson, and 
Siegel 2005) while, again in the context of a „Risk Society‟, heightened levels of 
anomie may make people averse to additional risks such as those surrounding 
childbearing (Philipov 2002). Finally, the corollary of an effect of anomie within the 
„demand‟ theory context is that in societies where a desire for „quality‟ children has 
developed (Becker 1991), couples may forego or delay childbearing because of a 
sensed loss of control over the environment in which the child would grow up.  
In sum, a broad theoretical generalisation assumes that in the context of 
increased „temporal uncertainty‟ coupled with the underlying shift towards greater 
overall economic uncertainty, people – especially the young – are „less able to make 
long-term binding commitments which may translate into…foregoing partnership 
and parenthood until they feel they have obtained adequate certainty for their future 
life path‟ (Mills and Blossfeld 2005: 18). This is likely to translate into an 
empirically observed pro-cyclical relationship between periods of „enhanced 
uncertainty‟ – characterised as economic shocks or recession – and childbearing 
behaviour.
5
  
As Sobotka, Skirbekk, and Philipov (2010) observe, „the impact of uncertainty 
in the developed countries has been addressed in relatively few empirical studies‟ 
meaning that „the wealth of theoretical arguments has not yet been properly tested‟ 
(p.18). Despite this, and returning to our theme of looking beyond a binary notion of 
employment, a number of important studies have suggested that labour market 
position, unstable or temporary work does, indeed, have a detrimental effect on both 
                                                          
5 On the other hand, it has been suggested by Friedman, Hechter, and Kanazawa (1994) that childbearing 
could serve as a strategy as minimising „biographical uncertainty‟ regardless of the nature of „economic 
uncertainty‟. Referring to the US in the 1990s, Friedman, Hechter, and Kanazawa (1994) suggest that „the 
impetus for parenthood is greatest among those whose alternative pathways for reducing uncertainty are 
limited or blocked. […] Having a child changes life from uncertain to relatively certain.‟ In this 
„uncertainty reduction‟ hypothesis (characterised, for example, by Bernardi, Klärner, and von der Lippe 
(2008) and Vikat (2004), women with poor prospects in the labour market have an elevated risk of first 
birth as they seek uncertainty reduction by motherhood which, they perceive, will bring „order and 
stability to the life-course‟ (Vikat 2004: 6). 
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fertility (e.g., Adsera 2005b) and fertility intentions (e.g., Pailhé 2009). Returning to 
our „dualisation‟ theme, for example, Adsera (2005b) finds a marked contrast 
between public sector jobs characterised by security and benefits being associated 
with faster transition to motherhood as opposed to short-term contracts being 
associated with delayed fertility. Stepping back to broader notions of uncertainty, 
Ranjan (1999) suggested that the declining fertility in Central and Eastern Europe in 
the 1990s was an „optimal reaction‟ to income uncertainty during the economic and 
political restricting of the era. For East Germany, studies by Bhaumik and Nugent 
(2006) found a U-shaped association between self-assessed employment uncertainty 
and fertility with women in the middle presenting the lowest likelihood of 
childbearing. Meanwhile, studies by Kreyenfeld (e.g., 2009) found that neither 
„subjective‟ nor „objective‟ measures of uncertainty significantly altered first birth 
rate, but that this did have strong educational differentiation with women with higher 
levels of education postponing parenthood when subject to employment 
uncertainties and women with lower levels of education often responding by 
becoming mothers. Perelli-Harris (2006) found that childbearing desires and 
outcomes in Russia were strongly, positively linked to subjective well-being among 
married women with at least one child. As we show in Section 3, our study attempts 
to add to the literature by explicitly linking perceptions of economic uncertainty 
mediated through perceptions of future individual and societal economic 
performance to changing patterns of reproductive uncertainty.  
 
 
2.4 The ‘Great Recession’, fertility, and perceptions of uncertainty 
Going beyond a causal link between unemployment and fertility and turning to the 
likely role of „enhanced temporal uncertainty‟ and the perception of worsening 
personal and/or societal conditions, it is crucial to understand the changing nature of 
the particular frameworks – or possibly, to coin Mills and Blossfeld‟s (2005) 
expression, the „institutional filters‟ – which mediate increased uncertainty and 
micro-level decision making during the „Great Recession. 
As well as direct increases in unemployment, the exaggerated rise of short-
term, fragile employment and the wider context of the „dualisation‟ of the labour 
market has further weakened employment systems. Furthermore, in the context of a 
free international labour market within the European Union, international migration 
can be a further particular response to economic uncertainty which, in turn, can 
create an ever greater pool of „outsiders‟ in fragile employment (Emmenegger et al. 
2012b). Welfare regimes have been widely affected by the process of fiscal 
consolidation taking the form of tax rises and austerity drives – with alternative 
emphases on each element in different settings. Austerity, and what Emmenegger et 
al. (2012a) call the „demise of the redistributive capacities of social policies‟ are 
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potentially very important in the extent to which they impact a wide array of support 
mechanisms surrounding the family. These range from direct contributions through 
family policy initiatives and other welfare provisions to the impact upon a declining 
number of jobs and opportunities in the public sector. These changes in government 
expenditure have been negative – and are projected to be deeper – in many settings 
across Europe, but especially in those most affected by the sovereign debt crisis 
(The Economist 2012). In sum, there are many processes beyond objective 
individual-level variables (such as unemployment) and macro-level variables (such 
as GDP per capita) which could have an impact on the sense of uncertainty felt by 
individuals.  
 
 
3. Research hypotheses  
To better understand the impact of economic uncertainty on fertility, we look at the 
relationship between economic crisis and individuals‟ reproductive decision-making 
which plays an important role in shaping fertility outcomes (Morgan 2001). 
Individual and societal attitudes and norms surrounding families and partnerships 
are an important mediator in the relationship between economic context and fertility 
outcomes. As Schoen et al. (1999) observe, „fertility is purposive behavior that is 
based on intentions, integrated into the life course, and modified when unexpected 
developments occur‟ (p.799). As such we would expect economic shocks – as 
unexpected developments – to create some modification. A focus on fertility 
intentions rather than simply on fertility is very critical, because a decline in fertility 
rates during the economic crisis would not give us insights on whether fertility 
intentions have just not been realised, or the birth intentions have actually changed.  
Moreover, there is currently relatively little research which explicitly links 
economic and social uncertainty and/or unemployment and economic shocks (as 
distinct from general income variation) to fertility intentions (e.g., Philipov, Spéder, 
and Billari 2006; Spéder and Vikat 2005). Linked to economic uncertainty, 
reproductive uncertainty is a further crucial factor. We know that 
uncertainty/certainty in fertility intentions plays an important role in defining and 
shaping fertility outcomes (e.g., Bernardi, Cavalli, and Mynarska 2010; Morgan 
1981), but again the relationship between economic shocks, unemployment and 
uncertainty in fertility intentions has been very little explored in the literature. Here, 
we study this relationship by using individual‟s perception of the economic situation 
of the country in which they reside, their household‟s financial situation and own 
personal job situation. The reason of giving emphasis on these perception variables 
is that, arguably, the perception of the crisis can be of higher relevance than the 
crisis per se in shaping individuals‟ birth plans. This is supported by research 
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showing the fertility responses to changes in consumer confidence (Fokkema et al. 
2008). Moreover, whereas a persistently bad economic and employment condition 
does not necessarily produce low fertility intentions, because material aspirations 
and child quality requirements are correspondingly weakened, a low relative 
economic situation is more likely to do so. Negative trends would lead to a 
substantially lower economic condition than the person has been used to. Thus, we 
expect that a perceived worsening in the personal job situation and household‟s 
financial situation has a negative effect on individual‟s fertility intentions 
(Hypothesis I a) and a positive effect on individual‟s reproductive uncertainty 
(Hypothesis I b).  
Country aggregate perceptions of an individual‟s personal job and a 
household‟s financial situation may have significant effects on top of individuals‟ 
own perceptions, because, even if one‟s personal job and household‟s financial 
situation has not worsened, the fact that a person sees that the situation has worsened 
for many other people in the country makes him worry about his own future 
situation. In other words, a widespread negative social climate may strengthen 
people‟s doubts about whether having a(nother) child at all, with the consequence 
that lifetime fertility intentions are reduced. Thus, aggregate negative assessments of 
people‟s past job situation and the household‟s financial situation are hypothesised 
to be negatively correlated with an individual‟s fertility intentions (Hypothesis II a) 
and positively correlated with an individual‟s reproductive uncertainty (Hypothesis 
II b). 
Finally, for the same reasoning we expect that people positively assessing the 
past country‟s economic situation are more prone to report a preference for larger 
family sizes and less likely to be uncertain about realising their reproductive plans 
(Hypothesis III). 
The fact that the assessment of the change in a country‟s economic situation, 
the household‟s financial situation, and personal job situation were related to the 
years in which the economic recession started to be experienced in several European 
countries allows us to use them as a proxy measure of the effects of the crisis and to 
investigate this effects in relation to fertility intentions and reproductive uncertainty.  
 
 
4 Data and methods 
4.1 Selected sample 
The multilevel analysis was conducted on a sample of 27 European countries based 
on the 2011 Eurobarometer survey. The stratified sampling procedure assures nearly 
equal probability samples of about 1,000 respondents aged 15 or above in each of 
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the countries (with the exception of Luxembourg, Malta, and Cyprus which had 
smaller sample sizes of 500 individuals). The sample size allows us to make equally 
precise estimates for small and large countries, as well as to make comparisons 
between sub-groups broken down by sex, age, education, marital status, and so on. 
The survey used a single uniform questionnaire design, with particular attention 
being paid to equivalent question wording across languages. The format was face-to-
face interview. 
Our analytical sample consists of 5,652 men and women aged 20 to 45 who 
answered the question on fertility intentions, including 3,556 childless respondents 
and 2,096 respondents with only one child (Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix). In 
the analysis of reproductive uncertainty the samples sizes are smaller, i.e., 2,581 
childless respondents and 1,029 respondents with one child, because certainty levels 
of intentions were asked only to individuals reporting positive fertility intentions 
(i.e., one or more children). Hence, the study of reproductive uncertainty at high 
parities (i.e., two and above) was precluded by the limited sample size of people 
reporting an intention to have a third or higher birth order child.  
Although missing answers may be symptomatic of particular fertility plans 
(Morgan 1981, Morgan 1982), individuals who did not report any valid answer for 
their intended family size (non-response rate was around 12%) were excluded due to 
the lack of auxiliary information on this item and in order to avoid potential 
complications. 
The multilevel models are formally based on two levels: individuals and 
countries referred to as “clusters”, as described in Tables A2-A4. Though the 
hierarchical structure is quite unbalanced, this is efficiently handled by using 
maximum-likelihood methods. Furthermore, the number of clusters and their sizes 
are sufficient to achieve high levels of power and accuracy of the asymptotic 
distributions of the estimators (Snijders and Bosker 1999) and thus allow for reliable 
inferences. 
 
 
4.2 Response variables  
Measuring childbearing intentions can present challenges, as intentions encompass 
several dimensions. The first distinction is between intentions/plans and 
ideals/desires: the number of children an individual intends/plans to have may not be 
the same as the number of children individuals would ideally like to have given no 
constraints. A second distinction is made between lifetime intentions (so-called 
child-number intentions or quantum intentions) and short-term intentions (so-called 
child-timing intentions or time-dependent intentions), which are parity-specific. 
Lifetime fertility intentions refer to the number of children individuals want to have 
over the whole life course and short-term intentions refers to a short-term framework 
Testa and Basten: Certainty of meeting fertility intentions declines in Europe during the great recession 
http://www.demographic-research.org 699 
to which the intentions are confined. A third distinction is made between 
childbearing intentions and the degree of certainty about those plans, which has been 
found to act as a strong predictor of future fertility behaviour (Schoen et al.1999; 
Westoff and Ryder 1977).  
In this analysis the response variables are the number of additionally intended 
children and the certainty attached to the probability of realising the stated 
childbearing intentions. Economic recession may also affect child-timing intentions, 
but the EB data do not contain information on the time of other relevant life events 
(such as, for example: leaving parental home, entering a partnership, age at birth of 
the first child) to which child-timing intentions could be usefully related.
6
 The lack 
of knowledge on the life course stage in which individuals are observed prevents a 
correct interpretation of the timing of childbearing, both actual and intended as well 
as its comparison through time based on several EB rounds. For this reason we just 
focus on child-number intentions. 
Lifetime fertility intentions are coded as a four-category variable: zero, one, 
two, and three or more children. Values greater than or equal to three were, in light 
of their low frequency, collapsed into a single category. The variable is surveyed 
through the following questionnaire item: “How many (more) children do you intend 
to have?” This prospective item comes immediately after the question about the 
number of children already had (“How many children, if any, have you had?”) and is 
clearly intended to provide information about the number of births respondents plan 
to have over (the rest of) their reproductive careers. Neither of the above-mentioned 
questions asked the interviewed people to make a distinction between biological and 
adopted children.  
Certainty about fertility intentions is measured through the following question: 
“How certain are you that you will have the number of children that you have just 
mentioned?” Response options are: “very sure”, “fairly sure”, “not very sure”, and 
“not at all sure”. The related variable takes four categories reflecting the above 
mentioned response options. Importantly, only respondents who provided a valid 
numerical answer other than “0 child” to the question on additionally intended 
number of children were asked about certainty level.  
The choice to examine separately lifetime fertility intentions and certainty 
about those intentions has been motivated by the purpose to disentangle the effects 
of the „Great Recession‟ exerted only on the quantum of fertility intentions from 
those exerted only on the certainty attached to intentions. In reading the results one 
should keep in mind that certainty is confined to people reporting positive fertility 
plans. 
                                                          
6 The only information that can be used in a dynamic perspective is the age at completion of the study, 
which is available in the data. 
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The questions on actual and additionally intended number of children, as well 
as the certainty of intentions, were asked also in a previous round of the EB survey 
conducted in 2006. They were formulated by using exactly the same question 
wording and they appeared in exactly the same order in the two surveys‟ 
questionnaires (in 2006 and 2011), allowing for a comparative analysis over time of 
lifetime fertility intentions and certainty. 
 
 
4.3 Explanatory variables 
Individual assessments of their country and their own economic situation over the 
past five years (i.e., 2006–2011) are used to estimate the effects of the economic 
crisis. Focusing on past rather than just current economic trends is in line with the 
relevance of relative expectations according to which a sudden deterioration in the 
economic situation is of higher importance than a bad economic situation because it 
frustrates earlier or well defined aspirations and expectations (Easterlin 1980).  
These assessments are measured through the following question: “Compared 
with five years ago, would you say things have improved, worsened or stayed about 
the same when it comes to ...?” Response options are: „better‟ „worse‟ „same‟ „don‟t 
know‟. Out of 15 items listed in this survey question we selected the country 
economic situation, the household financial situation, and the personal job situation. 
Each of these was included in the models as a dummy variable indicating a 
worsening in the specific situation. Perceptions of household‟s financial situation 
and personal job situation were considered at the individual as well as at country-
level.  
The individual-level explanatory variables include age, sex, enrolment in 
education, level of education, marital status, employment status, and self-location on 
the social scale. All of the covariates, which were selected because they are 
considered relevant predictors of fertility intentions in the literature, refer to the time 
of the interview.  
The age of respondents is continuous and centred on the rounded mean value of 
33 years. The other covariates, if categorical, are transformed into suitable dummy 
variables. Some collapsing of the categories was often needed: in such cases, several 
alternative collapsing schemes were tried in the model selection process. In the 
following, the covariates are described using the categorisation adopted in the final 
models. The marital status takes four categories: single, married, cohabiting, and 
separated. The last category also includes divorced respondents, while the married 
respondents are grouped together with the remarried people. The educational level is 
a three-category variable with low (up to 15 years), medium (between 16 and 19), 
and high (20 years or above) level of education. This categorization reflects the 
grouping available in the Eurobarometer data. A dummy variable indicating whether 
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respondents were still enrolled in education is also considered. Education is 
measured in the EB survey through the following survey question: “How old were 
you when you stopped your full-time education?” The employment status has three 
categories: employed, unemployed, and people not in the labour market. An 
interaction term between gender and not being active in the labour market was 
included in the models to take into account that most of the women not participating 
into the labour force are actually housewives, while among men not being active in 
the labour market is mainly related to an inability to work or retirement status. 
Unfortunately, if respondents were unemployed at the time of the survey, we were 
not able to make a distinction between long-term and short-term duration of 
unemployment spells. The self-positioning on the social scale is a variable measured 
on ten point values, one for the lowest level and ten for the highest level. A 
description of all the explanatory variables is reported in Table A1 of the Appendix 
(panels a and b). 
 
 
4.4 The models 
The multilevel analysis relies on the random intercept version of the proportional 
odds model for ordinal responses (e.g., Agresti, 2002). In the model presented below 
    denotes the response variable of individual i of cluster (i.e., country) j  
(                     and ijx  is the corresponding vector of covariates, 
including both individual-level and cluster-level variables. Moreover, 
ju  denotes 
the cluster-level error term, also called random effect. Throughout the analysis we 
made the standard assumptions on random effects, namely: (i) the random effects are 
independent and identically distributed following a normal distribution with zero 
mean and an unknown, estimable variance   
 ; (ii) the random effects are 
independent of the covariates.
 7
 
When the response variable is ordinal, taking the values        , one can 
define    
(    (          and adopt the random intercept proportional odds 
model, which can be viewed as a set of linear models for the M-1 cumulative logits: 
 
                                                          
7  The assumption that the random effects are independent of the covariates is analogous to the 
independence assumption on the error terms usually made in standard linear regression. However, it 
should be noted that the independence assumption concerning the random effects is not as stringent as it 
may appear, as Snijders and Bosker (1999) show that if the random effects are correlated with an 
individual-level variable, such correlation is removed as soon as the cluster mean of such variable is 
introduced as a further covariate. 
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       (
   
(  
     
(  
)   (   (   '       )                                      (   
where   is the intercept, β  is the vector of regression coefficients and ( )m  are 
the cutpoint parameters. The cutpoints must be ordered, (1) (2) ( 1)... M     , and the 
first cutpoint,
(1) , is fixed to zero for identifiability reasons. The minus sign 
preceding the linear predictor is necessary in order to interpret the effects of the 
covariates in the more natural way (i.e., a positive regression coefficient means that 
higher values of the covariate tend to yield higher values of the response variable). 
The assumption that the vector of regression coefficients β  is constant for all 
the M-1 cumulative logits, sometimes called the parallel regression assumption, 
leads to the proportional odds property, i.e., the ratio of the odds of two individuals 
does not depend on the category. The parallel regression assumption is very 
convenient for parsimony and interpretation, and can be checked using, for instance, 
the test developed by Brant (1990).  
Since the individual-level variance implied by the logit link is 2 / 3 , the 
intraclass correlation coefficient is  2 2 2/ / 3u u    for the proportional odds model 
(Snijders and Bosker 1999). 
We used ordinal regression model because both the intended number of 
children and the certainty of realising fertility intentions are measured on an ordinal 
scale. These models could be extended to handle partial proportional odds, but then 
the interpretation becomes somewhat tortuous. We tested the parallel regression 
assumption, and because only a few covariates in each model violated such an 
assumption – and only slightly – the proportional odds multilevel models were 
preferred. The significance of the variances of the random effects was assessed with 
the likelihood ratio test with corrected p-value, which has been found to be more 
reliable than the Wald test. 
The models were run separately for the childless sub-sample and individuals 
with one child, following the approach suggested by the rational choice theories 
(Yamaguchi and Ferguson 1995) and a conditional-sequential fertility decision-
making (Namboodiri 1972). The parity specificity of fertility intentions has been 
largely emphasised in previous research (Ajzen and Klobas 2013). The intention to 
have a first child marks a crucial transition in one‟s life course – transition to 
parenthood – whereas intentions to have subsequent children are qualitatively 
different and strongly affected by the experience of parenthood (Dommermuth, 
Klobas, and Lappegard 2011). We restricted the analysis to people at parity zero and 
one, because at parity two (and higher) there were too few people who reported the 
intention to have an additional child and for which the information on certainty 
would have been available (certainty was not asked to people reporting no child as 
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intention). If we are aware that this is a restriction in the scope of the analysis, we 
are also reassured by the fact that young people, who are presumably at the 
beginning of their reproductive careers, are also the group most severely exposed to 
the negative consequences of the economic downturn (Kravdal 1999; Neels 2010). 
The hierarchical structure of the data used in the multilevel analysis is described in 
Table A4. 
 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive findings: fertility intentions and reproductive uncertainty in 
2006–2011  
Intended family size of people of reproductive ages decreased in Europe between 
2006 and 2011. The change is statistically significant for Greece as well as for the 
EU27 as a whole in the sub-sample of childless people. In the EU27, the mean 
values went from 1.7 in 2006 to 1.59 in 2011 among childless people and from 1.76 
in 2006 to 1.71 in 2011 among people with one child (Table 1). Around half of the 
EU countries registered a decline in lifetime fertility intentions. At parity zero, the 
decrease was relatively high in Greece, the United Kingdom, Poland, Cyprus, and 
Sweden (each -0.20) but statistically significant only in Greece. At parity one, the 
decline is statistically significant in Bulgaria (-0.46), and Latvia (-0.30). Austria, 
which shows the lowest lifetime fertility intentions in both the survey rounds (1.55 
and 1.68, in 2006 and 2011, respectively), recorded an increase of about 0.4 children 
for people at parity zero. In Estonia and Latvia the trend was also on the rise, +0.33 
and +0.26, respectively, among childless people. At parity one, no marginal positive 
temporal changes in fertility intentions concerned Spain and Estonia (+0.2) 
(Table 1).  
Focusing on the „SDC‟ countries, results point out that the decrease in lifetime 
fertility intentions is statistically significant only among childless Greeks (-0.29). In 
Portugal and Italy the decline was of a lesser extent (-0.11 and -0.12, respectively, at 
parity zero, and -0.09 and -0.01, respectively, at parity one) and not statistically 
significant, while in Spain an increase was recorded which is statistically significant 
for people at parity one (+0.20). Ireland has seen a substantial stability of its lifetime 
fertility intentions over the observed period (Table 1).  
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Table 1: Mean ultimately intended family size of people aged 20 to 45, 
EU27. Years 2006 and 2011. 
  Parity zero  
Parity one  
  2006 2011 Diff. b-a  
2006 2011 Diff. d-c  
 
a b 
  
c d 
 
 
Austria 0.83 1.25 0.42 * 1.52 1.45 -0.07  
Belgium 1.72 1.58 -0.14 
 
1.83 1.72 -0.11 * 
Bulgaria 1.85 1.87 0.02 
 
1.96 1.50 -0.46  
Cyprus 2.41 2.18 -0.23 
 
2.25 1.67 -0.58  
Czech Rep. 1.62 1.64 0.02 
 
1.60 1.65 0.05  
Denmark 1.96 1.82 -0.14 
 
2.13 2.03 0.10  
Estonia 1.75 2.08 0.33 
 
1.84 2.06 0.22  
Finland 1.93 1.79 -0.14 
 
2.00 1.74 -0.26  
France 2.07 1.90 -0.17 
 
1.97 1.93 -0.04  
Germany 1.37 1.38 0.01 
 
1.43 1.55 0.12  
Greece 2.03 1.74 -0.29 * 1.76 1.69 -0.07  
Hungary 1.75 1.62 -0.13 
 
1.82 1.64 -0.18  
Ireland 1.92 1.94 0.02 
 
2.23 2.27 0.04  
Italy 1.58 1.46 -0.12 
 
1.57 1.56 -0.01  
Latvia 1.59 1.85 0.26 
 
2.02 1.72 -0.30  
Lithuania 1.85 1.94 0.09 
 
1.66 1.83 0.17  
Luxembourg 1.51 1.45 -0.06 
 
1.40 1.62 0.22  
Malta 1.50 1.55 0.05 
 
1.71 2.01 0.30 * 
Netherlands 1.49 1.51 0.02 
 
1.84 1.78 -0.06  
Poland 1.94 1.73 -0.21 
 
1.68 1.62 -0.06  
Portugal 1.59 1.48 -0.11 
 
1.53 1.44 -0.09  
Romania 1.31 1.50 0.19 
 
1.51 1.53 0.02  
Slovakia 1.57 1.69 0.12 
 
1.56 1.60 0.04  
Slovenia 2.01 2.11 0.10 
 
1.74 1.68 -0.06  
Spain 1.54 1.65 0.11 
 
1.56 1.76 0.20  
Sweden 2.02 1.82 -0.20 
 
1.87 1.95 0.08  
UK 1.79 1.50 -0.29 
 
1.78 1.94 0.16  
 
       
 
EU27 1.70 1.59 -0.11 * 1.76 1.71 -0.05  
 
Note: For people at parity zero, the mean ultimately intended family size is the mean additionally intended family size. For 
people at parity one, the mean ultimately intended family size is obtained by summing up the mean actual and the mean 
additionally intended family size. EU27 mean values are weighted by taking into account the country population size. A T-
test of the differences in means between 2006 and 2011 was performed. Differences statistically significant (at 5%) are 
marked with an asterisk. Sample sizes are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix.  
Source: authors’ elaborations based on Eurobarometer 2006 and 2011 
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Uncertainty in meeting the reported intended family size increased in Europe 
between 2006 and 2011. Sixteen of the 27 EU countries registered an increase in the 
share of people reporting uncertainty at parity zero, fewer countries (i.e., twelve) 
recorded a similar trend at parity one. In the EU27 as a whole, the temporal change 
is statistically significant only among childless people, while no substantial 
differences were observed among people with one child. At parity zero, the increase 
is statistically significant in Ireland, Greece, Spain, the United Kingdom, Romania, 
and Slovakia. At parity one, the increase is statistically significant only in Greece 
and Portugal (Table 2).  
Focusing on the „SDC‟ countries and the childless sub-group, the rise was +22 
and +21 percentage points in Greece and Ireland, respectively, and +15 and +14 
percentage points in Spain and Portugal, respectively. Positive changes of a bigger 
extent concerned people at parity one: +28 percentage points Portugal, +25 Greece, 
and +21 Spain, Ireland recorded an increase of just 7 percentage points. 
Surprisingly, in Italy the proportion of uncertain people was stable at parity zero, 
while it decreased from 42% in 2006 to 11% in 2011 at parity one. A statistically 
significant temporal decline in reproductive uncertainty was observed also in other 
EU countries: Malta, among people at parity zero, and Finland and Cyprus, among 
people at parity one (Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Share of people aged 20 to 45 who are uncertain about realising 
their reproductive plans, EU27. Years 2006 and 2011. 
  Parity zero  
Parity one  
  2006 2011 Diff. b-a  
2006 2011 Diff. d-c  
 
a b 
  
c d 
 
 
Austria 36 33 -3 
 
17 27 10  
Belgium 43 47 4 
 
29 14 -15  
Bulgaria 31 29 -2 
 
39 39 0  
Cyprus 28 36 8 
 
33 0 -33  
Czech Rep. 54 54 0 
 
50 45 -5  
Denmark 19 36 17 
 
11 31 20  
Estonia 29 27 -2 
 
17 31 14  
Finland 23 32 9 
 
39 10 -29 * 
France 41 52 11 
 
26 36 10  
Germany 37 40 3 
 
18 18 0  
Greece 37 59 22 * 16 41 25 * 
Hungary 66 61 -5 
 
37 46 9  
Ireland 45 67 22 * 24 31 7  
Italy 35 35 0 
 
42 11 -31 * 
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Table 2: (Continued) 
  Parity zero  
Parity one  
  2006 2011 Diff. b-a  
2006 2011 Diff. d-c  
Latvia 36 35 -1 
 
36 48 12  
Lithuania 25 39 14 
 
25 23 -2  
Luxembourg 41 24 -17 
 
26 10 -16  
Malta 94 55 -39 
 
0 52 52  
Netherlands 54 50 -4 
 
50 43 -7  
Poland 28 23 -5 
 
36 33 -3  
Portugal  29 43 14 
 
15 43 28 * 
Romania 20 43 23 * 37 28 -9  
Slovakia 59 77 18 * 42 42 0  
Slovenia 15 26 11 
 
9 11 2  
Spain 43 58 15 * 21 42 21  
Sweden 36 56 20 
 
30 30 0  
UK 26 48 22 * 20 27 7  
 
       
 
EU27 37 45 8 * 32 30 -2  
 
Note: Proportions of people who report to be unsure (either not very sure or not at all sure) to have as many children as they 
intend to have. EU27 proportions are weighted by taking into account the country population size. A T-test of the 
differences in means between 2006 and 2011 was performed. Differences statistically significant (at 5%) are marked with 
an asterisk. Sample sizes are reported in Table A3 in the Appendix. 
Source: authors’ elaborations based on Eurobarometer 2006 and 2011 
 
 
5.2 Individual’s, household’s, and country’s economic situation in 2006–2011  
Views of the economic recession are consistent with Europeans‟ general pessimism 
about the past, current, and future economic situation of their country and their own 
households, which is conducive to higher uncertainty in general, and to higher 
reproductive uncertainty. The country past economic trend was perceived negatively 
by the large majority of the people: In 15 out of the 27 EU countries the share of 
pessimism was 80% or above. Only in four countries, Sweden, Germany, Austria, 
and Poland, were the percentages below 50%. On average, three of four Europeans 
were concerned about the economic situation of the country observed in the past 
five-year period. At the top of the rank is Greece, with almost all people expressing 
negative opinions, followed by Spain, Ireland, and Portugal with percentages of 
around 90% (Figure 2, Panel a).  
Greek women and men of reproductive ages were also particularly concerned 
about their household‟s financial situation: 72% of Greek women and men reported 
a worsening in their household‟s financial situation over the past five years, similar 
percentages were considerably lower in all the other EU countries. They were just 
Testa and Basten: Certainty of meeting fertility intentions declines in Europe during the great recession 
http://www.demographic-research.org 707 
slightly above 50% in Ireland and Portugal, and 29% and 42%, respectively, in Italy 
and Spain. In Lithuania, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Latvia shares 
were close to 50%, while in the rest of Europe less than half of people of 
reproductive ages expressed a pessimistic view about household‟s financial 
conditions (Figure 2, panel b).  
The past personal job situation was negatively assessed by 30% of Europeans 
of reproductive ages. Once again, Greece is placed at the top of the country ranking 
with values above 50%, followed by Hungary, Romania, Lithuania, and Latvia, with 
percentages close to 50%. Focusing on the „SDC countries‟, in Ireland, Spain, and 
Portugal people‟s pessimism about their job situations registered a share of about 
40%, while in Italy a similar percentage is less than 30% (Figure 2, panel c).  
 
Figure 2: Share of people of reproductive ages (20-45) perceiving a 
worsening in country’s economic situation, household’s financial 
situation, and personal job situation over the past five years 
(2006-2011), EU27. 
 a) Perception of a worsening in country’s economic situation,  
2006-2011 
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Figure 2: (Continued) 
 b) Perception of a worsening in household’s financial situation,  
2006–2011 
 
 c) Perception of a worsening in personal job situation, 2006–2011 
 
 
Source: authors’ elaborations based on Eurobarometer 2011  
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5.3 Multilevel analysis of fertility intentions  
We have observed a decline in fertility intentions and an increase in reproductive 
uncertainty in Europe in the years 2006-2011. We have also shown that people‟s 
assessment of the country‟s economic situation, their household‟s financial situation, 
and their own job situation in the same five-year period has been quite pessimistic. 
In this section, the relationship between these two phenomena is examined using 
multilevel models. The multilevel analysis is focused on fertility intentions in 2011 
rather than the changes occurred in 2006-2011, because the two EB cross-sections 
(2006 and 2011) do not allow us to trace changes in fertility intentions and related 
uncertainty at individual level.  
Random intercept ordinal regression models were used to regress additionally 
intended number of children, and reproductive uncertainty, on country‟s, 
households‟, and individuals‟ past economic situation by controlling for a set of 
socio-demographic variables. Four different models were estimated separately for 
the childless sub-sample and the people with one child: empty models (Model I), 
models with only perception variables (Model II), models with all individual-level 
covariates (Model III), and full models with individual- and country-level covariates 
(Model IV). Country means of individuals‟ perception of household financial 
situation and personal job situation are included because individuals may well be 
influenced by the general negative social climate in the country even though they are 
not very pessimistic when assessing their own household‟s financial situation and 
job situation.  
The left panel on Table 3 reports the estimates of the random intercept ordinal 
regression models run on the childless sub-sample. As can be seen, the household‟s 
financial situation is negatively correlated with people‟s fertility intentions. But the 
association is statistically significant only in Model II including just the three 
perception variables, while it becomes not statistically significant in full Models III 
and IV. As far as the other two perception variables are concerned, they are both 
negatively correlated with fertility intentions but the perceived country economic 
situation never has a statistically significant effect, while the perception of job 
personal situation is statistically significant only in Model II. Looking at Table A5 
depicting the estimates of several models in which the socio-demographic 
backgrounds have been gradually included, it becomes evident that the effect of 
individuals‟ perception of the past household‟s financial situation is mediated by the 
individuals‟ employment status and self-positioning in the social scale. As soon as 
these two covariates are added in the models, the effect of the household financial 
situation loses its statistical significance. 
The right panel on Table 3 reports the estimates of the random intercept ordinal 
regression models run on the sub-sample of people with one child. As seen for the 
childless people, the effect of the perceived household‟s financial situation is 
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negatively correlated with fertility intentions. This effect is highly statistically 
significant in Model II, but it becomes only weakly statistically significant (at 10% 
level) in full Models III and IV, and the magnitude of the related coefficient 
decreases from -0.41 in Model II to -0.23 in Models III and IV. The procedure of 
gradual inclusion of the socio-demographic variables in the model points out that the 
relationship between fertility intentions and people‟s worries about their household 
financial situation is mediated especially by people‟s self-positioning in the social 
scale (Table A5). 
To sum up, people‟s perception of a worsening in their household‟s financial 
situation is the most relevant predictor of fertility intentions among the three 
perception variables, but its negative effect on fertility intentions is mediated by 
individuals‟ backgrounds, such as: employment status and – especially at parity one 
– self-positioning in the social scale. Interaction terms between a perceived 
worsening in their household‟s financial situation, on one side, and age, employment 
status, and education, on the other side, have been tried but not retained in the final 
models shown in Table 3 as they were not statistically significant. This result seems 
to suggest that the effect of this perception variable on intentions does not change by 
education, age, and employment status.  
The socio-demographic background variables that have a statistically 
significant effect on lifetime fertility intentions are: age, education, marital status, 
and employment status, and social status. In particular, intentions are positively 
associated with educational level, being enrolled in education, and positioning in the 
social scale, while they are negatively associated with age, being female, single, 
separated, or inactive. These predictors influence the reproductive intentions of both 
childless people and people with one child; however, being single or separated, and 
having a high level of education are statistically significant only at parity one, while 
being inactive is statistically significant only at parity zero, and its effect is not 
gendered, as indicated by the lack of the statistical significance of the interaction 
term (Table 3).
8
 Similarly, we could not find support for the fact that the effect of 
unemployment on fertility intentions is gendered (Rindfuss et al. 1988). As such, the 
interaction term (unemployment*female) was not retained in the final model.  
The country-level variance goes from 0.16 in the empty Model I to 0.11 in the 
full Models III and IV and it is statistically significant in all four models, for both 
parity zero and parity one, which supports the choice of using a random intercept 
version of the ordinal regression model. A random slope for the perceived 
household‟s financial situation has been considered in the analysis. The likelihood 
ratio test comparing the fitting of the two nested models (one with just a random 
intercept and one with a random intercept and a random slope) indicated that the 
                                                          
8 This interaction term was the only one retained in the final models although not statistically significant 
to control for the fact that being inactive identifies different categories for women and men: inactive 
women were mainly housewives and inactive men were mainly retired or unable to work. 
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random intercept model fits the data better than the model containing also a random 
slope. This finding reveals that the effect of a perceived worsening in the 
household‟s financial situation on fertility intentions does not vary from country to 
country within the EU.  
 
Table 3: Estimates from the random intercept ordinal regression models 
on lifetime fertility intentions. Beta coefficients, EU27. 
 
Parity zero: level one units: 3496, level-two units: 27 Parity one: level-one units:2053, level-two units:27 
 
Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  
Individual’s perception of a worsening in: 
      
  
    
Country econ. 
situation 
- 
 
-0.04  -0.05 
 
-0.06 
 
- 
 
0.04  -0.02 
 
-0.03 
 
   (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)    (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.12)  
Household fin. 
situation 
- 
 
-0.20 * -0.12 
 
-0.14 
 
- 
 
-0.41 *** -0.23 + -0.23 + 
   (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)    (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.12)  
Personal job 
situation 
- 
 
-0.31 *** -0.05 
 
-0.05 
 
- 
 
0.02  0.05 
 
0.04 
 
   (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.10)    (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.13)  
Other individual-level variables  
      
  
    
Age-33 
(average) 
- 
 
-  -0.15 *** -0.15 *** - 
 
-  -0.17 *** -0.17 *** 
     (0.01)  (0.01)      (0.01)  (0.01)  
(Age-33)^2 - 
 
-  -0.01 *** -0.01 *** - 
 
-  -0.01 *** -0.01 *** 
     (0.00)  (0.00)      (0.00)  (0.00)  
Male (reference) 
  
  
      
  
    
Female  - 
 
-  -0.21 ** -0.21 ** - 
 
-  -0.61 *** -0.60 *** 
     (0.08)  (0.08)      (0.10)  (0.10)  
Married 
(reference) 
 
 
  
      
  
    
Cohabiting - 
 
-  0.09 
 
0.09 
 
- 
 
-  0.15 
 
0.19 
 
     (0.09)  (0.10)      (0.13)  (0.13)  
Single - 
 
-  -0.11 
 
-0.11 
 
- 
 
-  -0.34 * -0.30 + 
     (0.10)  (0.09)      (0.17)  (0.17)  
Separated - 
 
-  -0.25 
 
-0.25 
 
- 
 
-  -0.83 *** -0.81 *** 
     (0.27)  (0.27)      (0.20)  (0.20)  
Low education 
(reference) 
    
      
  
    
Medium 
education 
- 
 
-  0.01 
 
0.01 
 
- 
 
-  0.26 
 
0.26 
 
     (0.15)  (0.15)      (0.17)  (0.17)  
High education - 
 
-  0.17 
 
0.19 
 
- 
 
-  0.78 *** 0.78 *** 
     (0.15)  (0.15)      (0.18)  (0.18)  
Enrolled in 
education 
- 
 
-  1.30 *** 1.31 *** - 
 
-  1.72 *** 1.72 *** 
     (0.25)  (0.25)      (0.44)  (0.44)  
  
  
Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 23 
712  http://www.demographic-research.org 
Table 3: (Continued) 
 
Parity zero: level one units: 3496, level-two units: 27 Parity one: level-one units:2053, level-two units:27 
 
Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  
Employed (reference)                
Unemployed  -  -  -0.16  -0.16  -  -  0.15  0.15  
     (0.11)  (0.11)      (0.15)  (0.15)  
Inactive -  -  -1.15 *** -1.15 *** -  -  -1.09 + -1.09 + 
     (0.22)  (0.22)      (0.56)  (0.56)  
Inactive * 
Female 
-  -  0.25  0.26  -  -  1.05 + 1.06 + 
     (0.16)  (0.16)      (0.56)  (0.56)  
Pos. in the social 
scale  
-  -  0.09 *** 0.09 *** -  -  0.07 + 0.06 + 
     (0.02)  (0.02)      (0.03)  (0.03)  
Country-means of perceptions              
Household fin. 
situation 
-  -  -  1.92 + -  -  -  -0.84  
       (1.14)        (1.39)  
Personal job 
situation 
-  -  -  -1.18  -  -  -  1.30  
       (1.33)        (1.59)  
First cut-point -1.47 *** -1.65 *** -1.06 *** -0.71 * -0.11  -0.22  -0.33  -0.27  
 (0.09)  (0.23)  (0.23)  (0.28)  (0.09)  (0.12)  (0.28)  (0.34)  
Second cut-point -0.67 *** -0.84 
 
*** 
-0.05  0.31  1.77 *** 1.67 *** 2.04 *** 2.10 *** 
 (0.09)  (0.23)  (0.23)  (0.28)  (0.10)  (0.13)  (0.29)  (0.35)  
Third cut-point 1.63 *** 1.48 
 
*** 
2.54 *** 2.9 *** 3.91 *** 3.81 *** 4.30 *** 4.36 *** 
 (0.09)  (0.23)  (0.23)  (0.28)  (0.17)  (0.19)  (0.32)  (0.38)  
                 
Country-level 
variance 
0.16 *** 0.13 *** 0.13 *** 0.11 *** 0.15 *** 0.15 *** 0.11 *** 0.11 *** 
                 
Log-likelihood -4342.6 -4323.3 -3929.6 -3927.0 -2161.8 -2152.9 -1813.0 -1812.6 
 
*p < . 05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Standard errors in parentheses. See Table A4 for details on the hierarchical structure of the 
data. 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Eurobarometer 2011. 
 
 
5.4 Multilevel analysis of reproductive uncertainty  
As for fertility intentions, we performed a multilevel analysis of reproductive 
uncertainty of meeting such intentions. The left panel on Table 4 reports the 
estimates of the random intercept ordinal regression models (Model I to Model IV) 
run on the childless sub-sample. As can be seen, a perceived worsening in the 
household‟s financial situation is positively associated with people‟s uncertainty. 
This result is robust to the inclusion of background variables: The beta coefficient 
goes from 0.34 in Model II with only perception variables to 0.32 in Model IV with 
all individual- and country-level variables and is always highly statistically 
significant (Table 4). The perception of a worsening in country‟s economic situation 
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is also positively correlated with reproductive uncertainty, but the statistical 
significance of the related beta coefficient is very weak (10% level) (see Model III 
and IV in Table 4). Interestingly, the effect of this covariate, as well as its statistical 
significance, increases slightly with the inclusion of the background variables in the 
model (Table A6).  
The right panel on Table 4 reports the estimates of the random intercept ordinal 
regression models on fertility uncertainty run on the sub-sample of people with one 
child. Similar to the childless sub-sample, the effect of a perceived worsening in the 
household‟s financial situation is positively correlated with reproductive uncertainty 
but the effect is very small and not statistically significant, regardless of which and 
how many socio-demographic background variables are included in the models 
(Table A6). However, a positive and statistically significant effect of a perceived 
deterioration in the household‟s financial situation on reproductive uncertainty is 
observed at the country-level: individuals are more uncertain about meeting their 
fertility intentions if they live in countries in which the share of people with a 
pessimistic view of their household‟s financial situation is higher. This finding 
indicates that the perception effect is exclusively a context effect, and thus most 
likely linked to the worsening economic conditions experienced in the years of the 
start of the recession. Finally, a perceived worsening in the country‟s economic 
situation is positively and statistically significantly associated with reproductive 
uncertainty but only at 10% (Models II-IV, Table 4). The magnitude of the related 
beta coefficient increases with the increasing number of variables included in the 
models (Table A6).  
To sum up, the effect of people‟s perception of a worsening in their 
household‟s financial situation on reproductive uncertainty is exerted only at 
individual-level at parity zero and only at country-level at parity one: uncertainty 
increases if people make a negative assessment of their household‟s financial 
situation (parity zero), or if they live in country in which many people make a 
negative assessment of their household‟s financial situation (parity one).  
Interaction terms between a perceived worsening in the household‟s financial 
situation, on the one side, and age, employment status, and education, on the other, 
have been tried but not retained in the final models shown in Table 4 as they were 
not statistically significant. This result points out that the effect of this perception 
variable on uncertainty does not change by education, age, and employment status.  
The socio-demographic variables that have a statistically significant effect on 
reproductive uncertainty are: age, marital status, social status, and number of 
additionally intended children. Uncertainty is positively and statistically 
significantly associated with age, being single, or separated, and planning more than 
one child, while it is negatively and statistically significantly associated with 
position in the social scale. These predictors influence reproductive uncertainty of 
both childless people and people with one child; however, being single is 
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statistically significant only at parity zero, while positioning on the social scale, 
being separated and number of additionally intended children are statistically 
significant only at parity one (Table 4). 
The country-level variance goes from 0.30 in the empty model to 0.26 in the 
full models for parity zero, while it goes from 0.10 in the empty model to 0.03 in the 
full models for parity one. Moreover, the country-level variance is statistically 
significant in all four models at parity zero and in all but the Model IV at parity one. 
This evidence supports the choice of using a random intercept version of the ordinal 
regression models, and it also suggests that the country mean of negative perceptions 
of the household‟s financial situation does explain the cross-country variation in 
reproductive uncertainty among people who have just one child. A random slope for 
the perceived household‟s financial situation has been considered. The likelihood 
ratio test comparing the fitting of the two nested models (one with and one without a 
random slope on the household‟s financial situation) indicated that the model 
containing a random intercept and a random slope did not fit the data better than the 
model containing just a random intercept. This evidence suggests that the effect of a 
perceived worsening in the household‟s financial situation on reproductive 
uncertainty does not vary from country to country within the EU.  
 
Table 4: Estimates from the random intercept ordinal regression models 
on uncertainty about additionally intended number of children. 
Beta coefficients, EU27. 
 
Parity zero: level one units: 2549, level-two units: 27 Parity one: level-one units:1015, level-two units:27 
 
Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  
Individual’s perception of a worsening in: 
      
  
    
Country economic 
situation 
- 
 
0.15  0.17 + 0.16 + - 
 
0.21  0.27 + 0.22 
 
   (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)    (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15)  
Household financial 
situation 
- 
 
0.34 *** 0.32 *** 0.32 *** - 
 
0.11  0.04 
 
0.00 
 
   (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)    (0.15)  (0.16)  (0.16)  
Personal job 
situation 
- 
 
0.05  0.03 
 
0.02 
 
- 
 
0.11  0.10 
 
0.09 
 
   (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)    (0.15)  (0.16)  (0.16)  
Other individual-level variables  
      
  
    
Age-33 (average) - 
 
-  0.03 ** 0.03 ** - 
 
-  0.04 ** 0.04 ** 
     (0.01)  (0.01)      (0.01)  (0.01)  
(Age-33)^2 - 
 
-  0.00 
 
0.00 
 
- 
 
-  0.00 
 
0.00 
 
     (0.00)  (0.00)      (0.00)  (0.00)  
Male (reference) 
  
  
      
  
    
Female  - 
 
-  0.00 
 
0.00 
 
- 
 
-  0.18 
 
0.20 
 
     (0.09)  (0.09)      (0.14)  (0.14)  
Married (reference)  
 
  
    
- 
 
-  
    
Cohabiting - 
 
-  0.17 
 
0.17 
   
  0.02 
 
0.06 
 
     (0.11)  (0.11)      (0.15)  (0.14)  
Single - 
 
-  0.62 *** 0.62 *** - 
 
-  0.23 
 
0.27 
 
     (0.10)  (0.10)      (0.22)  (0.22)  
Testa and Basten: Certainty of meeting fertility intentions declines in Europe during the great recession 
http://www.demographic-research.org 715 
Table 4: (Continued) 
 
Parity zero: level one units: 3496, level-two units: 27 Parity one: level-one units:2053, level-two units:27 
 
Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  
Separated - 
 
-  0.72 + 0.73 * - 
 
-  1.02 ** 1.03 ** 
     (0.37)  (0.37)      (0.32)  (0.32)  
Low education (reference)    
      
  
    
Medium education - 
 
-  -0.16 
 
-0.16 
 
- 
 
-  -0.07 
 
-0.05 
 
     (0.18)  (0.18)      (0.23)  (0.23)  
High education - 
 
-  -0.17 
 
-0.17 
 
- 
 
-  -0.19 
 
-0.14 
 
     (0.18)  (0.18)      (0.24)  (0.24)  
Enrolled in 
education 
- 
 
-  -0.53 + -0.52 
 
- 
 
-  0.54 
 
0.62 
 
     (0.31)  (0.31)      (0.54)  (0.54)  
Employed 
(reference) 
                
Unemployed  -  -  -0.15  -0.15  -  -  -0.04  -0.04  
     (0.13)  (0.13)      (0.19)  (0.19)  
Inactive -  -  0.43  0.43  -  -  -1.11  -1.12  
     (0.28)  (0.28)      (0.76)  (0.76)  
Inactive * Female -  -  -0.07  -0.07  -  -  1.03  1.05  
     (0.17)  (0.17)      (0.76)  (0.76)  
Pos. in the social 
scale  
-  -  -0.11  -0.11  -  -  -0.11 * -0.10 * 
     (0.03)  (0.03)      (0.04)  (0.04)  
One child intended 
(reference) 
                
Two or more -  -  0.07  0.07  -  -  0.31 * 0.30 * 
     (0.10)  (0.10)      (0.13)  (0.13)  
Country-means of perceptions              
Household fin. sit. -  -  -  -1.10   -  -  -  3.43 * 
       (1.68)        (1.32)  
Personal job sit. -   -  -   1.94   -   -  -   -2.96  + 
       (1.96)        (1.51)  
First cut-point -2.14 *** -1.94 *** -2.03 *** -1.88 *** -1.15 *** -0.93 *** -1.57 *** -1.11 ** 
 (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.29)  (0.37)  (0.10)  (0.14)  (0.36)  (0.40)  
Second cut-point 0.24 * 0.46 *** 0.41  0.56   0.75 *** 0.97 *** 0.39  0.84 * 
 (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.28)  (0.37)  (0.09)  (0.14)  (0.35)  (0.40)  
Third cut-point 1.91 *** 2.14 *** 2.12 *** 2.27 *** 2.59 *** 2.82 *** 2.29 *** 2.74 *** 
 (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.29)  (0.37)  (0.14)  (0.17)  (0.37)  (0.41)  
                 
Country-level 
variance 
0.30 *** 0.28 *** 0.28 *** 0.26 *** 0.10 ** 0.07*  0.09 * 0.03  
                 
Log-likelihood -3112.1 -3100.1 -3068.6 -3067.9 -1261.5 -1258.8 -1239.1 -1235.6 
 
*p < . 05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Standard errors in parentheses. See Table A4 for details on the hierarchical structure of the 
data. 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Eurobarometer 2011. 
 
 
6. Discussion  
In this paper we have studied the relationship between people‟s perceived worsening 
in both their resident country‟s and their own economic performance and lifetime 
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fertility intentions in Europe in the context of the recent „Great Recession‟. 
Crucially, we examined both intentions and the certainty of meeting these intentions. 
We expected that a perceived worsening in the country‟s economic situation, the 
household‟s financial situation and personal job situation could be a relevant factors 
in pushing lifetime fertility intentions down and reproductive uncertainty up.  
Descriptive findings have revealed that in the years of the start of economic 
crisis (2006–2011) a decline in lifetime fertility intentions occurred in Greece 
especially and in the EU27 as a whole among childless people, while uncertainty 
linked to reproductive plans increased in almost all the „SDC countries‟ (with the 
exception of Italy) and was particularly pronounced in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. 
Moreover, subjective evaluations of changes occurred in the country‟s economic 
situation, the household‟s financial situation, and one‟s personal job situation in the 
years 2006–2011 were quite negative for many people in most of the EU countries. 
Statistical empirical evidence suggests that these pessimistic views are inversely 
correlated with the stated fertility intentions in 2011 and directly correlated with 
reproductive uncertainty as reported in 2011. However, we could provide only 
limited support to our research hypotheses. 
Results of random intercept ordinal regression models point out that a 
perceived worsening in the household‟s financial situation over the past five years 
(2006–2011) affects reproductive uncertainty but not fertility intentions among 
childless people, while it affects only additionally intended number of children but 
not reproductive uncertainty among people with one child. As expected in 
Hypothesis I (see Section 3), the more pessimistic individuals are about the 
household‟s past financial situation, the more uncertain they are about the possibility 
of realising their reproductive plans if they have to start a family; moreover, the 
more pessimistic people are about the household‟s past financial situation, the more 
likely they are to report a smaller additional number of children if they have already 
had one child. This latter effect is, however, only weakly statistically significant. 
Evidently, the choice to have a family with children (at least one child) is normative 
and, as such, is not influenced by financial factors. Hence, if financial conditions are 
perceived as deteriorating, people reduce their intended family size only if they 
already have one child. At the initial stage of the reproductive process, employment 
and social status significantly mediate the association between fertility intentions 
and perceived worsening in the household‟s financial situation.  
By contrast, people who are at the beginning of the reproductive process 
become very uncertain about the possibility of realising their intended family size if 
they perceive a deterioration of their household‟s financial situation, while they are 
not very responsive to such a perceived deterioration if they have already one child. 
One possible explanation for this result is that people who have already become a 
parent have already learnt with the experience of the first child about the possible 
obstacles to realising their fertility plans and they might have been able to 
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incorporate such obstacles in their reports on intended family size by adjusting them 
downwards and making them – in such a way – more easily to be realised.  
We could provide only partial support for Hypotheses II and III because 
country-level effects were observed only for a perceived worsening in the 
household‟s financial situation in uncertainty models run on the sub-sample of 
people at parity one. The perception of a worsening in the country‟s economic 
situation did not turn out to be relevant in explaining individual and country-level 
variation, in either fertility intentions or uncertainty of meeting such intentions. 
Evidently, people‟s fertility preferences are driven by factors more closely related to 
economic conditions and their future perception by the populous.  
The study has some caveats. First, the effect of the economic recession is 
investigated only through people‟s perceptions of worsening economic conditions in 
the country, the household, and for themselves. Second, with only two cross-sections 
we could not relate the perceived worsening in people‟s households‟ situations to 
temporal changes in individual‟s fertility intentions and reproductive uncertainty. 
Third, the EB data contain only small national samples and question the robustness 
of our results. While recognising that quality of the data is an issue for the EB 
surveys, we want to point out that the EBs are the only harmonized data sources 
allowing a cross-national dynamic comparative analysis of lifetime fertility 
intentions and uncertainty in all the countries of the European Union. In addition, a 
comparison between the mean ultimately intended family size and the projected 
cohort fertility, as forecasted by Myrskylä, Goldstein, and Cheng (2012) for the 
cohorts born around 1979, has shown that the two measures come very close to each 
other supporting the consistency and validity of the information on fertility 
intentions provided by the EB surveys (Testa 2012).   
By thus providing empirical evidence that the recent „Great Recession‟ exerted 
only an indirect effect on fertility intentions, via the increasing uncertainty linked to 
the possibility of realising these intentions, we offer an explanation of why the 
economic crisis has been combined with lower fertility levels but not with intentions 
for smaller family size. However, we could expect a declining trend in fertility 
intentions in the future if we assume that people experiencing a worsening in 
economic conditions first become uncertain about the possibility of meeting their 
fertility intentions, and next – under persistent worsening economic conditions – 
start to revise their initially stated plans downwards.  
Finally, an important observation should be made regarding policy. Bridging 
the „gap‟ between fertility intentions and actualised fertility has been a cornerstone 
of EU-wide family policy since the era of low- and lowest-low fertility across 
Europe (NIDI 2010). While fertility intentions have declined in some settings – and 
could decline in others – if the „gap‟ becomes smaller it will more likely be as a 
result of a lack of supporting social and family policy rather than as a consequence 
of „bridging the gap.‟ 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Variables used in the multivariate analysis. Values in percent 
unless stated otherwise. 
Panel a)  Intentions analysis – Table 3 (N cases: Parity 0=3,496; Parity 
1=2,053)  
  Parity 0 Parity 1 
   
No child intended  20 48 
Only child intended 15 37 
Two children intended 48 13 
Three or more children intended 17 2 
   
Average age (years) 28.6 34.2 
   
Female  45 62 
Male 55 38 
   
Married  15 62 
Cohabiting 25 18 
Single 54 11 
Separated 6 9 
   
Low education 6 10 
Medium education 39 53 
High education 35 36 
Enrolled in education 20 1 
   
Employed 64 74 
Unemployed  12 13 
Inactive 24 13 
   
Self-positioning on the social scale (average) 5.77 5.55 
   
One additional child intended 19 29 
Two or more children intended 81 71 
   
% of people perceived a worsening in: 
  
Country economic situation 73 75 
Household’s financial situation 32 39 
Personal job situation 25 32 
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Table A1:  (Continued) 
Panel b)  Uncertainty analysis – Table 4 (N. cases: Parity 0=2549; Parity 
1=1015) 
  Parity 0 Parity 1 
   
Reproductive uncertainty   
Very sure 11 24 
Fairly sure 44 43 
Not very sure 31 26 
Not at all sure 14 7 
   
Average age (years) 27.2 31.1 
   
Female  44 59 
Male 56 41 
   
Married  14 62 
Cohabiting 27 24 
Single 53 10 
Separated 6 4 
   
Low education 5 8 
Medium education 37 48 
High education 35 42 
Enrolled in education 23 2 
   
Employed 63 74 
Unemployed  12 13 
Inactive 25 13 
   
Self-positioning on the social scale (average) 5.85 5.65 
   
% of people perceived a worsening in: 
  
Country’s economic situation 69 75 
Household’s financial situation 31 34 
Personal job situation 24 30 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Eurobarometer 2006 and 2011.  
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Table A2: Structure of the data used in the descriptive analysis shown in 
Table 1: respondents aged 20 to 45 by country and parity, EU27. 
  Parity 0 
 
Parity 1 
  2006 2011 
 
2006 2011 
      
Austria 184 174  115 75 
Belgium 166 149  75 71 
Bulgaria 128 104  145 107 
Cyprus 39 98  17 24 
Czech Rep. 146 145  110 101 
Denmark 148 122  56 57 
Estonia 76 115  82 95 
Finland 108 91  62 44 
France 132 123  82 76 
Germany 227 227  114 102 
Greece 250 209  65 68 
Hungary 108 130  74 95 
Ireland 105 96  58 73 
Italy 245 169  95 83 
Latvia 110 151  101 147 
Lithuania 106 141  91 82 
Luxembourg 49 72  31 43 
Malta 49 48  19 33 
Netherlands 113 164  58 41 
Poland 130 95  76 67 
Portugal 105 119  82 99 
Romania 104 135  101 126 
Slovakia 152 125  108 89 
Slovenia 197 137  90 67 
Spain 160 177  72 86 
Sweden 93 85  42 49 
United Kingdom 168 155  92 96 
      
EU27 3598 3556  2113 2096 
 
Note. Samples used in the analysis shown in Table 1.  
Source: authors’ calculations based on Eurobarometer 2006 and 2011. 
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Table A3: Structure of the data used in the descriptive analysis shown in 
Table 2: respondents aged 20 to 45 by country and parity, EU27. 
  Parity 0  
Parity 1 
  2006 2011  
2006 2011 
 
     
Austria 87 91  38 27 
Belgium 122 109  36 37 
Bulgaria 83 79  60 39 
Cyprus 33 70  13 11 
Czech Rep. 123 123  56 54 
Denmark 118 93  38 37 
Estonia 62 99  49 67 
Finland 82 69  44 23 
France 107 99  54 51 
Germany 134 141  35 42 
Greece 226 176  39 35 
Hungary 89 91  47 40 
Ireland 60 60  38 50 
Italy 167 113  38 34 
Latvia 80 127  60 77 
Lithuania 89 120  47 48 
Luxembourg 35 40  8 18 
Malta 25 27  6 8 
Netherlands 59 102  29 23 
Poland 110 73  45 30 
Portugal 78 90  35 33 
Romania 90 94  44 42 
Slovakia 105 103  49 34 
Slovenia 175 114  51 32 
Spain 111 125  32 50 
Sweden 71 59  29 27 
United Kingdom 111 94  35 60 
 
     
EU27 2632 2581  1057 1029 
 
Note. Samples used in the analysis shown in Table 2.  
Source: authors’ calculations based on Eurobarometer 2006 and 2011: sub-sample of respondents with positive fertility 
intentions. 
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Table A4: Structure of the data used in the multilevel regression analysis 
shown in Table 3 and Table 4: respondents aged 20 to 45 by 
country and parity, EU27. 
  Intentions analysis  
Certainty analysis 
  Parity 0 Parity 1  
Parity 0 Parity 1 
 
     
Austria 168 70  88 25 
Belgium 149 71  109 37 
Bulgaria 103 103  78 38 
Cyprus 94 22  66 10 
Czech Rep. 139 98  119 52 
Denmark 122 57  93 37 
Estonia 115 95  99 67 
Finland 91 44  69 23 
France 122 76  98 51 
Germany 223 102  138 42 
Greece 206 65  174 35 
Hungary 129 94  91 40 
Ireland 88 70  59 49 
Italy 167 80  112 33 
Latvia 149 147  126 77 
Lithuania 140 81  119 47 
Luxembourg 71 41  40 18 
Malta 48 33  27 8 
Netherlands 162 37  101 20 
Poland 89 65  70 30 
Portugal 117 95  89 33 
Romania 133 125  93 42 
Slovakia 125 89  103 34 
Slovenia 134 65  111 32 
Spain 176 86  125 50 
Sweden 84 49  59 27 
United Kingdom 152 93  93 58 
      
EU27 3496 2053   2549 1015 
 
Note. Samples used in the multilevel analysis shown in Tables 3 and 4.  
Source: authors’ calculations based on Eurobarometer  2011. 
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Table A5: Random intercept ordinal regression models on intended family 
size. 
Panel a) Parity zero: 3496 individuals (aged 20-45), EU27 
Country economic situation -0.04 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.05 
 
Household financial situation -0.20 * -0.20 * -0.20 * -0.19 * -0.19 * -0.16 + -0.12 
 
Personal job situation -0.31 *** -0.15 
 
-0.16 
 
-0.16 
 
-0.12 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.05 
 
Age 33 (average) 
  
-0.16 *** -0.16 *** -0.16 *** -0.15 *** -0.15 *** -0.15 *** 
(Age_33)^2 
  
-0.01 *** -0.01 *** -0.01 *** -0.01 *** -0.01 *** -0.01 *** 
Male (reference)  
              
Female 
    
-0.13 * -0.14 * -0.17 * -0.20 * -0.21 ** 
Married (reference) 
              
Single 
      
-0.11 
 
-0.12 
 
-0.13 
 
-0.11 
 
Cohabiting 
      
0.08 
 
0.08 
 
0.07 
 
0.09 
 
Separated 
      
-0.29 
 
-0.27 
 
-0.26 
 
-0.25 
 Low education (reference) 
             
Medium education 
        
0.13 
 
0.05 
 
0.01 
 
High education 
        
0.35 * 0.24 
 
0.17 
 
Enrolled in education 
        
0.49 *** 1.45 *** 1.31 *** 
Employed (reference) 
              
Unemployed 
          
-0.21 
 
-0.16 
 
Inactive 
          
-1.24 *** -1.15 *** 
Female * Inactive 
          
0.26 
 
0.25 
 Positioning in the social scale 
          
0.09 *** 
First cut-point -1.65 *** -1.53 *** -1.58 *** -1.61 *** -1.40 *** -1.56 *** -1.06 *** 
Second cut-point -0.84 *** -0.53 *** -0.59 *** -0.61 *** -0.40 * -0.55 *** -0.05 
 
Third cut-point 1.48 *** 2.03 *** 1.97 *** 1.95 *** 2.17 *** 2.03 *** 2.54 *** 
Country level variance 0.19 *** 0.13 *** 0.13 *** 0.13 *** 0.12 *** 0.13 *** 0.13 *** 
Log-likelihood -4323.3 -3970 -3968 -3964 -3955 -3937 -3930 
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Table A5: (Continued) 
Panel b)  Parity one: 2053 individuals (aged 20-45), EU27 
Country economic situation 0.04 
 
0.00 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
Household financial situation -0.41 *** -0.38 *** -0.35 * -0.29 * -0.28 * -0.26 * -0.23 + 
Personal job situation 0.02 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.07 
 
0.04 
 
0.05 
 
Age 33 (average) 
  
-0.16 *** -0.17 *** -0.17 *** -0.17 *** -0.17 *** -0.17 *** 
(Age_33)^2 
  
-0.01 *** -0.01 *** -0.01 *** -0.01 *** -0.01 *** -0.01 *** 
Male (reference)  
              
Female 
    
-0.57 *** -0.52 *** -0.57 *** -0.60 *** -0.60 *** 
Married (reference) 
              
Single 
      
-0.38 * -0.32 * -0.33 * -0.31 
 
Cohabiting 
      
0.15 
 
0.17 
 
0.17 
 
0.18 
 
Separated 
      
-0.88 *** -0.82 *** -0.83 *** -0.81 *** 
Low education (reference) 
             
Medium education 
        
0.31 
 
0.28 
 
0.26 
 
High education 
        
0.86 *** 0.83 *** 0.78 *** 
Enrolled in education 
        
1.46 *** 1.75 *** 1.72 *** 
Employed (reference) 
              
Unemployed 
          
0.11 
 
0.15 
 
Inactive 
          
-1.08 + -1.09 + 
Female * Inactive 
          
1.04 + 1.05 + 
Positioning in the social scale 
          
0.07 * 
First cut-point -0.22 * -0.78 *** -1.14 *** -1.18 *** -0.65 *** -0.69 *** -0.33 
 
Second cut-point 1.67 *** 1.48 *** 1.15 *** 1.14 *** 1.71 *** 1.67 *** 2.04 *** 
Third cut-point 3.81 *** 3.70 *** 3.38 *** 3.38 *** 3.97 *** 3.93 *** 4.30 *** 
Country level variance 0.15 *** 0.14 *** 0.14 *** 0.15 *** 0.11 *** 0.11 *** 0.11 *** 
Log-likelihood -2153 -1871 -1854 -1839 -1817 -1815 -1813 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Eurobarometer 2011 
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Table A6: Random intercept ordinal regression models on reproductive 
uncertainty. 
Panel a)  Parity zero: 2549 individuals (aged 20-45), EU27 
Country economic 
situation 0.15 
 
0.16 + 0.16 + 0.17 + 0.17 + 0.17 + 0.17 + 0.17 + 
Household fin. 
situation 0.34 *** 0.34 *** 0.34 *** 0.33 *** 0.33 *** 0.34 *** 0.32 *** 0.32 *** 
Personal job 
situation 0.05 
 
0.03 
 
0.03 
 
0.02 
 
0.01 
 
0.03 
 
0.03 
 
0.03 
 Age  
  
0.03 ** 0.03 ** 0.03 ** 0.03 ** 0.03 ** 0.03 ** 0.03 ** 
(Age_33)^2 
  
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 Gender (reference: male)  
               Female 
    
-0.04 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.01 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 Married (reference) 
                Single 
      
0.61 
 
0.61 
 
0.62 
 
0.62 
 
0.62 
 Cohabiting 
      
0.17 
 
0.17 
 
0.17 
 
0.17 
 
0.17 
 Separated 
      
0.74 * 0.73 * 0.72 * 0.71 
 
0.71 
 Low education (reference) 
               Medium education 
        
-0.18 
 
-0.16 
 
-0.15 
 
-0.15 
 High education 
        
-0.21 
 
-0.19 
 
-0.17 
 
-0.17 
 Enrolled in 
education 
        
-0.15 
 
-0.57 
 
-0.52 
 
-0.52 
 Employed (reference) 
               Unemployed 
          
-0.14 
 
-0.16 
 
-0.15 
 Inactive 
          
0.45 
 
0.42 
 
0.43 
 Female * Inactive 
          
-0.07 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.06 
 Pos. in the social scale 
          
-0.03 
 
-0.04 
 One child int. (reference) 
               Two or more children 
             
0.07 
 First cut-point -1.94 *** -2.00 *** -2.02 *** -1.72 *** -1.90 *** -1.88 *** -2.08 *** -2.03 *** 
Second cut-point 0.46 *** 0.40 *** 0.38 ** 0.71 *** 0.52 * 0.55 * 0.35 
 
0.41 
 Third cut-point 2.14 *** 2.09 *** 2.07 *** 2.42 *** 2.24 *** 2.27 *** 2.07 *** 2.12 *** 
Country level 
variance 0.28 *** 0.28 *** 0.28 *** 0.27 *** 0.28 *** 0.27 *** 0.28 *** 0.28 *** 
Log-likelihood -3100.1 -3095.9 -3095.7 -3072.5 -3071.8 -3069.6 -3068.8 -3068.6 
 
 
  
Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 23 
734  http://www.demographic-research.org 
Table A6: (Continued) 
Panel b)  Parity one: 1015 individuals (aged 20-45), EU27 
Country economic 
situation 
0.21 
 
0.23 
 
0.24 
 
0.26 + 0.28 + 0.28 + 0.29 + 0.27 + 
Household fin. 
situation 
0.11 
 
0.12 
 
0.11 
 
0.10 
 
0.09 
 
0.10 
 
0.04 
 
0.04 
 
Personal job situation 0.11 
 
0.12 
 
0.12 
 
0.12 
 
0.11 
 
0.11 
 
0.11 
 
0.10 
 
Age  
  
0.03 * 0.03 ** 0.03 ** 0.04 ** 0.04 ** 0.04 ** 0.04 ** 
(Age_33)^2 
  
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
Gender (reference: male)  
               
Female 
    
0.20 
 
0.16 
 
0.18 
 
0.17 
 
0.17 
 
0.18 
 
Married (reference) 
                
Single 
      
0.33 
 
0.29 
 
0.27 
 
0.24 
 
0.23 
 
Cohabiting 
      
0.05 
 
0.05 
 
0.04 
 
0.03 
 
0.02 
 
Separated 
      
1.06 ** 1.04 ** 1.03 ** 1.01 ** 1.02 ** 
Low education (reference) 
               
Medium education 
        
-0.11 
 
-0.10 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.07 
 
High education 
        
-0.25 
 
-0.24 
 
-0.17 
 
-0.19 
 
Enrolled in education 
        
0.28 
 
0.64 
 
0.65 
 
0.54 
 
Employed (reference) 
                
Unemployed 
          
0.02 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.04 
 
Inactive 
          
-1.18 
 
-1.13 
 
-1.11 
 
Female * Inactive 
          
1.09 
 
1.05 
 
1.03 
 
Pos. in the social 
scale             
-0.11 * -0.11 ** 
One child int. (reference) 
               
Two or more children 
              
0.31 * 
First cut-point -0.93 *** -0.98 *** -0.87 *** -0.81 *** -0.97 *** -0.98 *** -1.60 *** -1.57 *** 
Second cut-point 0.97 *** 0.94 *** 1.05 *** 1.12 *** 0.96 *** 0.96 *** 0.35 
 
0.39 
 
Third cut-point 2.82 *** 2.80 *** 2.91 *** 3.01 *** 2.85 *** 2.85 *** 2.25 *** 2.29 *** 
Country level 
variance 
0.07 * 0.08 * 0.08 * 0.09 ** 0.09 * 0.08 * 0.08 * 0.09 * 
Log-likelihood -1259 -1255 -1254 -1248 -1246 -1245 -1242 -1239.1 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Eurobarometer 2011. 
 
 
